The Importance of Clean Teams in Mergers and Acquisitions-Cox Yeats
- 5 hours ago
- 3 min read
The interrogation of a target business in a merger typically requires the merging parties to
conduct a thorough due diligence investigation.
At the conclusion of a due diligence investigation the acquirer should, at a minimum, have
sufficient insight to assess whether the merger ought to proceed, notwithstanding any identified
risks.
Critically, due diligence requires the disclosure of detailed and often highly sensitive
information about the target business. In mergers involving competing parties, a tension arises
between the acquirer's need for sensitive information to support its decision and the potential
competition law concerns arising from such disclosure under the Competition Act, 1998 (Act
No. 89).
At its core, South African competition law requires that merging parties remain independent
economic actors until a transaction has been approved and implemented.
The Guidelines on the Exchange of Competitively Sensitive Information between Competitors
published by the Competition Commission on 24 February 2023 (Guidelines) define
competitively sensitive information as “Information that is important to rivalry between
competing firms and likely to have an appreciable impact on one or more of the parameters of
competition”.
The difficulty here is that due diligence, by its nature, often necessitates the disclosure of
precisely the type of information that competitors would not ordinarily share on the market.
Such information may include, inter alia, pricing models and strategies, customer-specific data,
cost structures/margins and general business plans.
Importantly the Guidelines state that an “information exchange may also allow firms to achieve
collusive or coordinated outcomes without concluding explicit agreements to co-operate.”
Quite simply, if the sharing of information in a due diligence allows the acquirer to alter its
method of competing by rendering portions of the relevant market transparent, such conduct
could be viewed as anti-competitive.
Agreements which produce restrictive horizontal practices are dealt with and prohibited under
section 4(1) of the Competition Act. Under this section, agreements and arrangements can be
considered anti-competitive if they include, inter alia, evidence of price fixing, market allocation
or collusive tendering. While due diligence investigations will not typically involve explicit
agreements of this nature, the provision underscores the strict approach adopted to co-
ordination between competitors.
The sentiment captured above is further echoed in the Guidelines which state that “the
exchange of Competitively Sensitive Information may also be Anti-competitive by increasing
the likelihood of, establishing, or facilitating collusion or coordination among competitors.”
The need for restrictive protections in a due diligence investigation is therefore required to
maintain the independence of competitors in a merger, to prevent collusive practices, and
further preserve the competitive edge of the target should the merger be abandoned.
To deal with these issues, modern M&A transactions have produced the concept of the so-
called “clean team”. Clean teams comprise a select and ringfenced set of individuals who are
permitted to access sensitive information that cannot be disclosed to the broader deal
team. The clean team performs a balancing act by considering and analysing the sensitive
information while ensuring that the acquirer does not gain insights that could produce a
competitive advantage.
Who may be considered designated “clean” strongly depends on their involvement in the
general commercial decision making of the acquirer. Typically, a clean team will comprise
external advisors such as attorneys, accountants and economists – those specific individuals
removed from the management and directional planning of the acquirer.
When properly implemented and vetted, clean teams enable merging parties to complete due
diligence investigations with confidence while preserving the integrity of the competitive
process. In this sense, clean teams are slowly becoming an indispensable feature in South
African deal-making, particularly in mergers involving a horizontal competitive element.




Comments